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1. INTRODUCTION
In many cases, both minority shareholders of controlled companies'
and taxing authorities have a stake in the prices controlled companies set in
their dealings with related parties.' This Comment examines three distinct
areas of the law that potentially apply to instances where a controlled
company deals with related parties: corporate fiduciary duty in state laws,
fiduciary duty law under ERISA,3 and the IRS transfer pricing rules under
section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code. After examining the potentially
applicable law, this Comment suggests ways in which the laws might
evolve to best serve majority shareholders, minority shareholders, and
taxing authorities.
State fiduciary duty laws operate to prevent a controlling shareholder
from engaging in the types of self-dealing transactions that would unfairly
erode minority shareholder value.4 When the minority shareholder is a
retirement fund subject to ERISA,5 not only does the controlling
* Benjamin Hussa is a third-year law student at the University of Pennsylvania.
1. In this Comment, the term "controlled companies" refers to companies with a
shareholder who has a sufficient ownership stake to effectively control operations of the
company, regardless of the wishes of minority shareholders. Often this controlling
shareholder is a parent company.
2. The term "related parties" refers to other companies owned by the same ownership
that owns the company in question.
3. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(2006).
4. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2006) (setting out rules that protect
shareholders from corporate transactions in which directors have a financial interest).
5. Retirement plans are often minority shareholders in controlled companies. This was
the case in Ford Motor of Can. v. Ont. Mun. Employees Ret. Bd, 41 B.L.R. (3d) 74 (2004),
discussed infra in section II of this Comment.
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shareholder have a duty to refrain from improper self-dealing, but ERISA
imposes a duty of prudence 6 on the person or persons charged with
overseeing the fund.7 This duty imposed by ERISA presumably means the
plan fiduciary is responsible for ensuring that the majority shareholder does
not engage in self-dealing that erodes the value of the plan. Finally, in the
tax arena, the so-called "transfer pricing" regulations under section 482 of
the Internal Revenue Code 8 are designed to prevent controlled groups of
companies from improperly shifting income in order to reduce the group's
federal income tax burden.
In the situation at issue in this Comment, these three bodies of law
share a central concern: how can the law prevent the improper shifting of
income out of a controlled company? As we will see, U.S. tax law9 and
state fiduciary duty laws'0 deal with this issue very differently, and the
ERISA rules are vague and not instructive. This Comment will discuss and
compare state fiduciary duty law, ERISA fiduciary duty law, and tax law
approaches to dealing with improper transactions of controlled companies.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2006).
7. In certain cases, including the prototype case described immediately below, pension
funds and other employee stock ownership plans own stock amounting to a substantial
minority interest in a company that is otherwise controlled. In such cases, the controlling
shareholder, often the employer, may, as in the prototype below, be able to illegally enrich
itself at the expense of the pension fund or plan's interest. Even though these "transfer
pricing" issues may seem obscure to the average pension fiduciary, and indeed to the labor
lawyer, the fiduciary in charge of monitoring the pension fund or plan's interest must be
extremely diligent about monitoring such issues. As the prototype demonstrates, the dollar
amounts at stake can be extremely large.
8. Treas. Reg. § 1.482 (as amended in 2004) [hereinafter section 482 regulations].
9. Nearly all industrialized countries have well developed transfer pricing rules. See
generally INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRIcING 2002/2003 (PricewaterhouseCoopers ed.,
2003) (describing the transfer pricing rules for countries from around the world). Most
countries have adopted a transfer pricing regime based on the model developed by the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. See TRANSFER PRICING
GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS (Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development ed., 2001) [hereinafter OECD GUIDELINES].
The U.S. transfer pricing rules, as set out in the section 482 regulations, are similar in
substance to the OECD GUIDELINES in that both are based on the "arm's length standard" of
inter-company pricing, as discussed further in this Comment. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)
(describing the arm's length standard). The scope of this Comment will be limited to
discussion of the U.S. rules, although the analysis applies to any transfer pricing regime
based on the arm's length standard.
10. In the United States, a corporation's internal affairs are governed by state law. See
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS 101 (8th
ed. 2000). Most of the issues discussed in this Comment are issues faced by large
multinational corporations. As of 1996, fifty-six percent of all U.S. corporations listed on
major stock exchanges, and sixty-two percent of the corporations listed on the New York
Stock Exchange, were incorporated in Delaware. Id. Delaware fiduciary duty law is also
fairly well-developed with regard to the issue of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. For these
reasons, the discussion in this Comment will involve Delaware corporate law.
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Most importantly, this Comment will discuss how each area of law might
be altered in order to improve its efficacy, fairness, and administrative ease.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Fact Pattern: The Ford Motor Case
Before describing the contours of the law, it is helpful to understand
the typical fact pattern to which the analysis in this Comment applies. To
date, there have been no published state court decisions in the United States
that could serve as an explanatory tool.1" A Canadian case 12 (hereinafter
"Ford Motor") between Ford Motor Company of Canada and one of its
largest minority shareholders, the Ontario Municipal Employees
Retirement Board, provides a good illustration of how corporate fiduciary
duty law, ERISA fiduciary duty law, and tax law must address the same
substantive issue.1
3
1. Squeeze-Out Merger
Ford Motor Company (hereinafter "Ford") was incorporated in the
United States in 1903, and Ford Canada was incorporated as a separate
company in Canada in 1904.14 Up until 1995, a portion of Ford Canada's
shares were publicly owned, although Ford always owned enough shares to
be a controlling shareholder.15  Over the years, Ford increased its
ownership in Ford Canada to nearly ninety percent, 16 allowing Ford to
effectuate a "squeeze-out" of the remaining shareholders of Ford Canada. 7
The squeeze-out would make Ford Canada a 100 percent subsidiary of Ford
11. One case, decided under New York law, comes close. See Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc.,
629 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1980) (deciding issues related to the valuation of a company where
shareholders claimed that the company would be worth more if transfer prices with a related
company had been proper.) Lewis, however, is not a proper teaching prototype for this
Comment, as it does not involve international transactions that would be of interest for the
tax law component of this Comment, nor is the minority shareholder in the case a retirement
plan subject to ERISA.
12. Ford Motor of Can. v. Ont. Mun. Employees Ret. Bd., 41 B.L.R. (3d) 74 (2004).
13. Ford Motor is not the only case involving a conflict between a U.S. parent company
and the shareholders of a Canadian subsidiary. See Taylor v. LSI Logic Co., 715 A.2d 837
(Del. 1998) (discussing a case where Canadian minority shareholders complained that the
U.S. parent company's transfer pricing policies depressed the value of their shares for a U.S.
buyout; the case was dismissed on procedural grounds).
14. Ford Motor of Can., 41 B.L.R. (3d) at para. 3.
15. Id. at paras. 3-4.
16. Id. at para. 3.
17. Id. at para. 7.
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by having Ford purchase all outstanding shares of Ford Canada that were
publicly owned."8
Because Ford owned more than ninety percent of Ford Canada's
outstanding shares, minority shareholders' approval was not required for
the transaction.1 9  While minority shareholders could not prevent the
transaction from going forward, they did have a statutory appraisal remedy
to ensure that Ford paid adequate consideration for the shares.2°
2. Valuation of Ford Canada's Shares
Before effectuating the transaction, the interested parties engaged
experts to assist them in valuing the shares held by the minority
shareholders. Ford Canada put in place a special committee of the Board
of Directors,21 made up of board members other than Ford nominees, to
manage the valuation process on behalf of the minority shareholders and to
offer advice on whether to accept Ford's offer or contest it.22  Ford
originally offered $150 per share, 23 and ultimately increased its offer to
$185 per share.24 Based on its valuation experts' advice, the special
committee recommended that the minority shareholders accept this offer.25
Experts hired by OMERS, however, arrived at a value per share of
$624.50.26 How could there have been such a large discrepancy?
Ford's valuation of the shares was primarily based on a discounted
cash flow methodology that analyzed Ford Canada's future revenue
27streams. Ford Canada had a history of losses, and future projections of
the company had to take this into account. From 1985 to 1995, Ford
Canada had a cumulative operating loss of $497 million.28 This obviously
depressed the value of Ford Canada's shares.
18. Id.
19. Id. at para. 20.
20. Ford Motor of Can., 41 B.L.R. (3d) at para. 19. The Canadian squeeze-out merger
scheme is, with respect to the details described above, identical to the Delaware squeeze-out
merger scheme. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2006) (providing for a similar squeeze-out
scenario when a corporation that is incorporated in Delaware owns ninety percent or more
of another corporation).
21. Although not explicitly stated in the facts of the case, it can be assumed for the
purposes of using this case as a prototype that Ford controlled the Ford Canada Board of
Directors and therefore had effective control over the management of Ford Canada.
22. Ford Motor of Can., 41 B.L.R. (3d) at para. 25.
23. The dollar amounts mentioned in this portion of the discussion are in Canadian
dollars.
24. Ford Motor of Can., 41 B.L.R. (3d) at para. 25.
25. Id.
26. Id. at para. 22.
27. Id. at para. 200.
28. Id. at para. 76.
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3. Ford Canada's Transfer Pricing with Ford
In common business parlance, when companies within controlled
corporate groups have business dealings with each other, the prices charged
for the property or services are referred to as "transfer prices". Since a
transfer price, once paid, shifts monies from one company to another, it
will, like any item of revenue or expense, affect on a company's
profitability. The more a company transacts with related parties, the more
transfer pricing affects the company's profitability. This effect is important
because, unlike most revenues and expenses, transfer prices are not
determined by the market. Whereas most prices are negotiated at arm's
length by parties who have divergent interests-that is, the seller wants a
high price while the buyer wants a low price-transfer prices are usually
set by the top management of a group of controlled companies. Transfer
prices are not negotiated.
Returning to the Ford Motor prototype, both Ford Canada and Ford
undertook three main activities: manufacturing, assembly, and vehicle
sales of completed cars to Ford dealers.29 For each activity, operations of
the two companies were coordinated to maximize overall group
efficiency.30
Ford Canada and Ford had significant transactions with each other.
Both companies would buy manufactured components from the other to
use in assembling cars, and both companies would buy fully assembled
cars from the other to resell to dealers in their respective domestic
markets.3' In all cases, Ford set the transfer pricing policies for these inter-
company sales without negotiating with Ford Canada.32 The transfer prices
were based on formulas that had been in place since 1965. 33
The bankers that Ford Canada's minority shareholders hired believed
that the transfer pricing formulas put in place by Ford management were
unfair to Ford Canada. The bankers believed that if the transfer prices had
been fair to Ford Canada-that is, if the prices were what unaffiliated
parties would have negotiated at arm's length-Ford Canada would have
been financially better off, and the company's shares would be worth more.
Specifically, if the transfer prices had been and would continue to be fair,
the minority shareholders' bankers believed the Ford Canada shares would
29. See Id at paras. 48-56 (describing the three functional divisions within Ford and
Ford Canada).
30. FordMotor of Can., 41 B.L.R. (3d) at paras. 48-56.
31. See id. at para. 51 (describing Ford and Ford Canada's integration of their
manufacturing and assembly operations).
32. See id. at para. 66 (stating that Ford Canada was "bound to accept the.., prices set
by Ford").
33. Id. at para. 45.
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be worth $642 per share, not $130 per share.34
4. Lessons of the Ford Motor Prototype
The primary lesson of the prototype is that if transfer prices among
members of a controlled group are unfair, or not as they would be in an
arm's length transaction, minority shareholders of an individual company
within the group will see the value of their shares depressed.35
The minority shareholders of Ford Canada are not the only group with
an interest in seeing that Ford and Ford Canada get their transfer pricing
policies right. If Ford Canada had earned more income due to more
favorable transfer prices, it would have paid more in income tax to the
Canada Revenue Agency (hereinafter "CRA").36 Therefore, the CRA has
an incentive to ensure that Ford Canada has transfer pricing policies that
meet its standards of acceptability.
While the Ford Motor prototype ended up in court as a result of a
merger, the facts of the case would have presented problems for the
minority shareholders even if there had not been one. Although the transfer
pricing policy between Ford and Ford Canada had been in place since
1965, it was not until thirty years later that Ford Canada's shareholders
finally complained about it.
If the transfer pricing policies were improperly set in favor of Ford,
then Ford Canada's profits had been artificially low for thirty years, costing
Ford Canada's shareholders millions, or perhaps billions, in lost share
appreciation and dividends. Even if there had not been a merger, Ford
Canada's minority shareholders would have had reason to protest that the
company's day-to-day transfer pricing arrangements constituted unfair
oppression of their rights, and that Ford Canada's majority shareholder,
Ford, was engaging in illegal self-dealing.37
The focus of this Comment is on transfer pricing issues rather than
merger issues. Therefore, the following discussion and analysis will center
on: first, how state and ERISA fiduciary duty laws currently operate to
34. Id. at paras. 22, 25.
35. Of course, if transfer prices are improper but favorable to the minority shareholder,
the value of the minority shareholders' interest will be artificially high. This was not the
case in the Ford Motor prototype, and is unlikely to be the case if the controlling parent acts
in its best interests. This type of situation could occur if the company in which minority
shareholders hold an interest was domiciled in a low-tax jurisdiction, in which case it could
be in all parties' best interests to artificially shift income to this company.
36. The CRA is the Canadian analogue of the IRS in the United States.
37. In fact, Ford Canada's minority shareholders did make this claim in court,
requesting that the court award the minority shareholders damages for "oppression" between
1985 and 1995. Ford Motor of Can., 41 B.L.R. (3d) at para. 26. Again, the application of
Canadian law to this claim is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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ensure that controlling shareholders do not damage minority shareholders'
interests through transfer pricing; and second, how tax law functions
differently to prevent the same types of manipulative transfer pricing
schemes. After discussing the relevant law, the focus of the analysis will
turn to how state fiduciary duty law, ERISA fiduciary duty law, and tax law
might be improved.
III. DISCUSSION
A. State Fiduciary Duty Laws
This section will discuss how the current law deals with the
shareholder issues created by the transfer pricing problem discussed in the
Ford Canada prototype. For the reasons previously discussed,38 this
discussion will center on Delaware corporate law.
1. What Is A Controlling Shareholder?
Under Delaware law, a shareholder becomes a controlling shareholder
with concomitant fiduciary obligations "only if it owns a majority interest
in or exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation. 3 9 Thus,
a relevant threshold question in this discussion is whether or not a
shareholder has sufficient power to influence transfer prices.4" If a
shareholder lacks the power to influence the company's pricing policy, no
duty attaches. As illustrated by the quotation above, Delaware law
recognizes that a shareholder's power is not necessarily linked to
ownership, and attaches fiduciary duties to any shareholder with the ability
to exercise control over the company.41 zReturning to the Ford Motor
prototype, Ford met both prongs of the Delaware controlling shareholder
test: Ford owned over fifty percent of Ford Canada and exercised control
38. See supra note 10 (explaining the significance of Delaware corporate law in the
United States).
39. Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113-14 (Del. 1994) (citing
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987)) (emphasis
in original).
40. The question of what constitutes the power to control the affairs of a corporation is
a complex inquiry in itself, and is beyond the scope of this Comment.
41. This approach is not unique to Delaware law. Section 1.10 of PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (American Law Institute ed.
1994) also defines a controlling shareholder as one who "(1) [o]wns ... more than fifty
percent of the ... corporation; or (2) [o]therwise exercises a controlling influence over the
management or policies of the corporation . . .by virtue of the person's position as a
shareholder."
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over the company.
2. Delaware Standards of Review
Delaware courts have developed different common law standards to
apply in different types of fiduciary duty cases. The two most common
standards, and the most relevant for this analysis, are the business judgment
rule and the entire fairness standard. Before discussing which standard
would apply in the prototypical transfer pricing case, it is useful to discuss
how each standard operates.
a. The business judgment rule
Delaware corporations law is founded on "the fundamental principle.
that the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by.
its board of directors. ' 42  Since the board of directors runs the
corporation, the Delaware courts should not be a forum for second-
guessing the judgment of a board of directors, as long as the board's
decision is procedurally correct. That is, as long as a board "acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company ... that judgment will be respected
by the courts., 43 The Delaware courts will not hold a director liable for an
informed, good faith business decision absent gross negligence. 44 The
business judgment rule is a legal presumption that a decision by a board is
valid if proper procedures were followed. Even if the results show that it
was clearly foolish, the decision will be respected by the courts.
b. Entire fairness
Compared to the business judgment rule, entire fairness is a much
more difficult standard for defendants in shareholder suits, as there is no
presumption that the defendant's conduct was the result of a valid business
judgment. Instead, in cases judged under the entire fairness standard, the
court looks with an impartial eye to examine whether or not a transaction
meets the court's standard for "fairness."
The Delaware courts have specifically defined fairness as having "two
basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price. [Fair dealing] embraces
questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated,
42. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). This principle is codified in
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14 1(a) (2005).
43. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
44. Id.
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structured, negotiated, [and] disclosed to the directors. . . ,4' Thus, similar
to analyses under the business judgment rule, the focus in this prong of the
fairness standard is on procedure rather than substance.
In contrast, the fair price aspect "relates to the economic and financial
considerations of the [transaction] ... ,,46 The Delaware courts, after
hearing expert testimony, render judgment about what the fair price in a
transaction should have been. Even though the Delaware courts have
identified the entire fairness test as consisting of two distinct concepts, the
court in Weinberger noted that "the test for fairness is not a bifurcated one
as between fair dealing and price. All aspects of the issue must be
examined as a whole since the question is one of entire fairness. 47
c. Which standard would apply in transfer pricing cases?
48
Which standard the Delaware courts apply depends on the specific
claim. If the Ford Motor prototype had been controlled by Delaware law,
the minority shareholders of Ford Canada could have made a claim against
Ford for self-dealing. According to the Delaware courts, "[s]elf-dealing
occurs when the parent, by virtue of its domination of the subsidiary,
causes the subsidiary to act in such a way that the parent receives
something from the subsidiary to the . . . detriment to[] the minority
stockholders of the subsidiary. 'A9 This description fits transfer pricing
cases perfectly. In the prototype, Ford, by virtue of its control over Ford
Canada, caused Ford Canada to agree to an intercompany pricing scheme
that benefited Ford, to the detriment to the minority shareholders of Ford
Canada.
The Delaware courts have made clear which standard applies in cases
of self-dealing involving a controlling shareholder. The policy of the
Delaware courts is that "when a controlling shareholder stands on both
sides of [a] transaction the conduct of the parties will be viewed under the
more exacting standard of entire fairness as opposed to the more
deferential business judgment [rule] standard."50
Thus, in the Ford Motor prototype, if Ford Canada's minority
shareholders had brought suit under Delaware law, not only would the
defendants not have received the benefit of the business judgment rule
45. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. The business judgment rule and the entire fairness standard are used in a wide range
of cases under Delaware law. The following discussion is limited to the types of
transactions at issue in this Comment unless otherwise noted.
49. Sinclair Oil Co. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
50. Kahn v. Tremont Co., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997) (citing Kahn v. Lynch
Communication Sys. 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994)) (emphasis added).
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(which would have resulted in a presumption of fair transfer prices), but
they would have had the burden of proving that the transaction was fair to
the minority shareholders. Applying the entire fairness standard in cases of
self-dealing has its analogue in Delaware corporate statutes.5'
d. Standard shifting and burden shifting
In certain circumstances, a shareholder" engaging in self-dealing can
improve his chances of prevailing in Delaware courts by undertaking
procedural safeguards to protect against self-dealing that would be unfair to
minority shareholders. The Delaware courts are more lenient toward
defendants who undertake such safeguards, especially: (1) having a
committee of disinterested directors53 approve a transaction; or (2) having
disinterested shareholders5 4 approve a transaction. 5  The logic is that "[i]f.
. .independent stockholders [or directors] have approved the transaction,
they have ... made the decision that the transaction is 'a fair exchange.'
As such, it is difficult to see the utility of ... litigation . ,56
Therefore, if a transaction involving self-dealing is approved by
disinterested shareholders or independent directors, the court is more
inclined to respect the decision and less likely to substitute its own
judgment. The way this works procedurally is that, if disinterested
shareholder or independent director approval is obtained, the court may
change the standard of review it uses to judge a shareholder lawsuit, and
51. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(3) (stating that "[n]o contract or transaction...
between a corporation and any other corporation... in which 1 or more of its directors...
have a financial interest, shall be void or voidable ... if. . . [t]he contract or transaction is
fair as to the corporation").
52. The discussion will continue to refer to shareholders who engage in self-dealing,
rather than directors who engage in self-dealing. However, the situation would likely
involve a shareholder who is also a director, or who has a director representing his or her (or
its, if the shareholder is a corporation) interests. Since, under Delaware law, a corporation is
controlled by its board of directors, it is through representatives on the board of directors
that a shareholder would be able to exert his or her interests and possibly engage in self-
dealing.
53. In the Ford Motor prototype, this would be any director not controlled or appointed
by Ford. Whether a director is controlled by a majority shareholder could be a very
difficult, fact-intensive determination. See, e.g., Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d
879, 886 (Del. Ch. 1999) (discussing whether a director's relationship to a large shareholder
impairs his ability to impartially make decisions in the best interests of the company).
Analysis of whether a director is independent or not is beyond the scope of this Comment.
54. In the Ford Motor prototype, this would be any shareholder, such as OMERS, not
Ford or anyone connected to Ford.
55. This procedural shift has its analogue in DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(2)-(3)
(2005), which states that a transaction shall not be void or voidable if an independent board
committee or independent shareholders approve a transaction with respect to which there
has been full and proper disclosure.
56. Harbor Fin. Partners, 751 A.2d at 901.
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may also shift the burden from the defendant to the plaintiff.
In any claim of improper self-dealing, regardless of whether or not it
involves a majority shareholder, the defendant originally bears the burden
of showing that the transaction in question meets the entire fairness
standard. 7  However, if the defendant shows that shareholders or
independent directors approved the transaction, the burden shifts back to
the plaintiff. Whether or not the standard of review changes depends on
whether or not the defendant is connected with a controlling shareholder.
In cases where the defendant accused of improper self-dealing is not a
controlling shareholder, or is not connected with a controlling shareholder,
the standard of review shifts along with the burden. As for the types of
cases in which this happens, Delaware law seems to be in a state of flux. In
one subset of self-dealing cases, in which executives and board members
have determined their own compensation, "informed, uncoerced,
disinterested shareholder ratification of a transaction in which corporate
directors have a material conflict of interest has the effect of protecting the
transaction from [entire fairness] judicial review ...,58
In ordinary self-dealing cases, as described in the Ford Motor
prototype, Delaware law used to offer plaintiffs who had gained
shareholder or independent director approval a burden shift from entire
fairness to the business judgment rule. This, however, recently changed
when the Delaware Supreme Court announced that
[it had], since . . . Rosenberg9 [was] decided, more fully
developed the standard by which it should judge a board's
actions when it engages in a transaction with one or more of its
own directors. At the time former Vice Chancellor Berger
decided Rosenberg, our Courts held that an interested board was
required to show the entire fairness of a transaction unless the
transaction was entitled to a safe harbor [because of shareholder
or independent director approval], in which case the board would
receive the protection of the business judgment rule .. . . It is
now clear that even if a board [obtains independent director or
shareholder approval], the board is not entitled to receive the
protection of the business judgment rule. [Obtaining approval]
merely shifts the burden to the plaintiffs to demonstrate that the
57. See Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys. Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994) (stating
that a controlling shareholder engaging in a self-dealing transaction has the burden to show
that the transaction meets the entire fairness standard); Cooke v. Oolie, No. CIV. A. 11134,
1997 WL 367034, at *8 (Del. Ch. 1997) (stating that board members engaging in self-
dealing in a company without a controlling shareholder have the burden to show that a
transaction meets the entire fairness standard).
58. Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (citations omitted). In
Vogelstein, the standard shifted from entire fairness to waste, which is even more deferential
to defendants than the business judgment rule.
59. Rosenberg v. Oolie, CIV. A. No. 11, 134, 1989 WL 122084 (Del. Ch. 1989).
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transaction was unfair.60
This is a change with respect to how the court evaluates standard self-
dealing transactions in companies without a controlling shareholder. Even
with approval by disinterested shareholders or directors, entire fairness still
applies with only a burden shift.
As discussed above, the same standard applies for transactions
involving a controlling shareholder. Like the revised rule concerning non-
controlling shareholders, "[a]n approval of [a] transaction by an
independent committee of directors or an informed majority of minority
shareholders shifts the burden of proof on the issue of fairness from the
controlling or dominating shareholder to the challenging shareholder-
plaintiff."
61
B. IRS Transfer Pricing Rules
Transfer pricing has been of utmost importance to taxing authorities
around the world. One reason for this is the massive dollar amounts that
are at stake.62 Another is that transfer pricing is viewed as a soft target,
where there is no absolute "right" answer as to what transfer prices should
be. Because of this, taxpayers may be more likely to settle disputes with
the IRS, rather than risk large adjustments and penalties.63
Conceptually, it is relatively simple for a large taxpayer to use transfer
pricing for tax avoidance purposes. If a taxpayer is a member of a
controlled group of companies operating in many countries around the
world, the taxpayer's central management need only adjust its internal
prices for goods, services or intangible property in a way that boosts
taxable income in low tax jurisdictions64 and lowers taxable income in high
tax jurisdictions.65
The Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter "the Code") has only one
section specifically dedicated to transfer pricing: section 482.66 While the
60. Cooke, No. CIV. A. 11134, 1997 WL 367034, at *9.
61. Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1117 (citing Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil, 493 A.2d 929, 937-938
(Del. 1985)).
62. See, e.g., Glaxo Fights $2.7 Billion in Deficiencies, Seeks $1 Billion Refund for
Discrimination, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) G-4 (April 9, 2004) (describing the IRS' $2.7 billion
tax deficiency assessed against GlaxoSmithKline related to transfer pricing).
63. INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING 2002/2003 (PricewaterhouseCoopers ed., 2003)
at 1.
64. Or no tax jurisdictions, such as so-called "tax haven" jurisdictions.
65. Or, provide something of value without reporting any inter-company charge at all.
This is especially an issue in the case of services.
66. 26 U.S.C. § 482 (2006) is less than one-half of one page long, and states in relevant
part: "In any case of two or more ... businesses . . . owned or controlled directly or
indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may ... allocate gross income ... among
such ... businesses, if he determines that such ... allocation is necessary in order to prevent
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Code gives the IRS a broad grant of authority, the regulations to section
482 of the Code provide much more detailed rules. In fact, the section 482
regulations currently number over fifty pages.67
1. The Section 482 Regulations
a. The arm's length standard
Since 1934, the arm's length standard has been the standard used by
the IRS to evaluate the appropriateness of a taxpayer's transfer prices.68
According to the section 482 regulations, "[a] controlled transaction meets
the arm's length standard if the results of the transaction are consistent with
the results that would have been realized if uncontrolled taxpayers had
engaged in the same transaction under the same circumstances.,
69
b. Pricing methods under the section 482 regulations
It is difficult to measure what "results ... would have been realized if
uncontrolled taxpayers had engaged in the same transaction under the same
circumstances., 70  The section 482 regulations specify a number of
methods available to a taxpayer to estimate what an arm's length price
should be for the taxpayer's inter-company transaction.7'
The methods described in sections 1.482-3 and 1.482-4 take different
approaches to determining appropriate transfer prices. Some determine
transfer prices very directly. For example, the comparable uncontrolled
price method "evaluates whether the amount charged in a controlled
transaction is arm's length by reference to the amount charged in a
comparable uncontrolled transaction.', 72  Simply put, a controlled
transaction is deemed to be arm's length if unrelated parties engage in
similar transactions at similar price levels. Many transactions, however,
evasion of taxes ......
67. See INCOME TAX REGULATIONS (CCH ed. 2004) (setting out rules for the application
of the arm's length standard).
68. INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING 2002/2003 (PricewaterhouseCoopers ed. 2003)
at 105.
69. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (as amended in 2003).
70. Id.
71. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3 (as amended in 1995) (describing methods to determine
transfer prices in connection with a transfer of tangible property, including the "comparable
uncontrolled price method," the "resale price method," and the "cost-plus method"); Treas.
Reg. § 1.482-4 (1994) (describing methods of determining taxable income in connection
with a transfer of intangible property, including the "comparable uncontrolled transaction"
method).
72. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(b)(1) (as amended in 1995).
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involve unique products, product volumes, or economic terms and cannot
be measured against transactions between unrelated parties.73
Other methods specifically described in the section 482 regulations,
such as the comparable profits method, require substantially less
comparability.74  Rather than examining the prices charged between
unrelated companies at the transactional level, the comparable profits
method looks to what independent companies earn at an operating profit
level, and uses those profitability levels to measure what a controlled
company should earn.75 For instance, if independent marketing services
companies generally earn profits equal to ten percent of their sales, a
controlled subsidiary that performs marketing services solely for its parent
company should set its transfer prices to earn a profit equal to ten percent
of its sales.
Although the section 482 regulations specifically list methods
taxpayers can use to determine and document their transfer prices,76
taxpayers are not limited to these specified methods. Taxpayers or IRS
auditors can use a method not specified in the section 482 regulations if it
is the best method available.77
c. The best method rule
When it comes to choosing among the many specified or unspecified
methods that are available, the section 482 regulations state that the "best
method" must be used.7 8 The best method is the one that, "under the facts
and circumstances, provides the most reliable measure of an arm's length
result.,
79
73. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(b)(2)(ii)(A) (as amended in 1995) (acknowledging that
"because even minor differences in contractual terms or economic conditions could
materially affect the amount charged in uncontrolled transactions, comparability under the
comparable uncontrolled price method depends on close similarity with respect to these
factors").
74. INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING 2002/2003, supra note 9, at 2.
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5 (2004).
76. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-3 (as amended in 1995), 1.482-4 (1994).
77. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c) (as amended in 2003) (discussing the use and
determination of the "best method"). The best method rule is discussed in Section
lII(B)(1)(c) of this Comment, infra.
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(1) (as amended in 2003).
79. Id.
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2. Documentation Requirements
The purpose of section 482 of the Code, and of the related regulations,
"is to ensure that taxpayers clearly reflect income attributable to controlled
transactions, and to prevent the avoidance of taxes with respect to such
transactions. 80  Since, as discussed above, manipulating transfer prices
allows a company to avoid massive amounts of taxes, the IRS only
provides penalty safe harbors to taxpayers who prepare and file,
contemporaneous with their tax returns, documentation that their transfer
prices meet the arm's length standard.8' The IRS is becoming increasingly
strict about this documentation requirement, and is imposing penalties for
non-compliance.82
C. ERISA Duty of Prudence
In a situation like the Ford Motor prototype, there is an important
distinction between ERISA rules on the one hand and state fiduciary duty
and IRS rules on the other. State fiduciary duty and IRS rules specifically
prohibit the types of transactions discussed in the prototype, whereas
ERISA rules merely charge the person or persons in charge of the pension
fund with monitoring the fund. Therefore, unlike state fiduciary duty and
IRS rules, ERISA rules have no bearing on the actions of the controlling
shareholder or management of the company. ERISA rules require the plan
fiduciary to prevent harmful self-dealing not because it is illegal, but
merely because it is detrimental to the plan. The contours of ERISA
fiduciary law are discussed below.
1. The Meaning of "Prudence"
ERISA section 404(a)(1)(B) requires any person in charge of plan
administration to act "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity
and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of
a like character and with like aims."83 Experts have argued that "familiar
80. Treas Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(1) (as amended in 2003).
81. 26 U.S.C. § 6662(e)(3)(B)(i)(II) (2006).
82. See Langdon Reveals Compliance Initiative; Examiners Told to Emphasize
Documentation, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) G-I (Feb. 10, 2003) (describing IRS division
Commissioner Larry Langdon's direction to examiners to more actively enforce the thirty-
day deadline for providing transfer pricing documentation).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2006).
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with such matters" means that the standard is really a "prudent expert"
standard, and not a "prudent man" standard.84 Commentators believe that
it will be some time before the courts provide a clear picture of
the new prudence standard. In the meantime, the Department of
Labor [has stated that the] . .. inquiries [a fiduciary must make]
concerning a certain investment are limited to those aspects
which the fiduciary knows or should know are relevant to the
particular investment in question.85
Thus, applying these standards, would a pension manager in charge of
managing the pension's minority stake in a controlled company be
responsible for monitoring transfer pricing issues? Given that in the Ford
Motor case, the courts found that transfer pricing had cost Ford Canada
hundreds of millions in foregone profits, it seems that transfer pricing
should be deemed "relevant to the particular investment in question.,
86
Finally, it should be noted that this issue is too big to be ignored by a
plan fiduciary in this situation. Under ERISA, the plan can sue to recover
from the fiduciary an amount equal to the pension plan's loss.
87
IV. ANALYSIS
The purpose of this analysis is to examine how IRS transfer pricing
rules, ERISA fiduciary duty rules, and the Delaware fiduciary duty rules
apply in a case like the Ford Motor prototype, as well as to discuss how
application of each set of rules would benefit from a cooperative approach
to satisfying all three sets of rules. While the transactions between Ford
and Ford Canada were in fact subject to IRS transfer pricing rules, this
analysis needs to assume that the relationship between Ford Canada and its
shareholders was governed by Delaware law,88 and that OMERS was
subject to ERISA. 9
84. JEFFREY D. MAMORSKY, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: ERISA AND BEYOND, at 12-17
(1981).
85. Id. at 12-18.
86. id. A separate issue would be whether in the Ford Motor case the plan fiduciary
would be found not to have acted according to the standard of care required in the situation
(were the plan a U.S. plan covered by ERISA). It seems that the fiduciary could say that he
or she relied on the accounts reports for Ford Canada. Whether such an argument would
prevail is unclear. The final analysis in this Comment describes a means of avoiding this
issue entirely.
87. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109 and 1132 (1999).
88. Since Ford Canada is a Canadian corporation, it is not governed by Delaware law.
89. As a Canadian pension plan, OMERS is not subject to ERISA.
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A. Referencing the Protections of Delaware Law to Document Transfer
Prices
With respect to transfer prices between the United States and foreign-
related companies, the IRS transfer pricing rules mandate that the prices
reflect what would be charged between parties operating at arm's length.
While a method like the comparable uncontrolled price method provides an
accurate and direct method of determining transfer prices, it is often
impossible to use such a direct method.
For instance, in the Ford Motor prototype, Ford Canada and Ford only
sold vehicle components and completed vehicles to each other or other
members of the controlled Ford group. There was no market price to
which to refer, because there was no public market for these items nor
anything even remotely similar. The problem of the lack of comparable
transactions becomes even more acute when addressing a transfer pricing
issue related to intellectual property, which is very often unique and
impossible to ascribe a market price. Therefore, the comparable
uncontrolled price method, which provides such direct results, is
unavailable.
Among the remaining specified methods in the section 482
regulations, there are more subjective ones, such as the comparable profits
method. As defined in the section 482 regulations, the comparable profits
methods is designed to find a range of acceptable profitability, not a
pinpointed "correct" answer.90 Therefore, due to its indirect nature, such
analysis will be unlikely to reproduce exactly what would have happened at
arm's length.
B. The Minority Shareholder as an Arm's Length Party
With respect to transfer pricing transactions, the minority shareholder
of a controlled company is, in many ways, like an arm's length party. Just
as an arm's length party would seek the best possible price for itself, the
minority shareholder wants to see the company in which it has an interest
get the best price possible when dealing with its parent company. As
described above, the parent company has an opposing interest.
The minority shareholder also has some power in the transaction.
While an arm's length party can walk away from a deal it does not like, the
minority shareholder finds power in its access to the courts. If a minority
shareholder feels that the transfer price in a transaction is unfair, he can
seek a judicial remedy. As a party to a self-dealing transaction, the
90. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(b)(3) (as amended in 2004) (describing how to calculate
an arm's length range of profitability using the comparable profits method.)
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majority shareholder will have the burden of showing that the transaction
was entirely fair.
The power of the minority shareholder is unequal to that of an arm's
length party. The majority shareholder can still put in place a transfer
pricing scheme without the consent of the minority shareholder, but the
minority shareholder's ability to get a judicial remedy is powerful. 91
C. The Existence of a Minority Shareholder as Transfer Pricing
Documentation
Because, as discussed above, a minority shareholder has some
attributes similar to an arm's length party, a controlled company with a
minority shareholder might argue that it should be able to refer to this
relationship when it prepares its required transfer pricing documentation. 92
If a company like Ford Canada prepared its transfer pricing documentation
by stating that its transfer prices with Ford must be arm's length, or else
Ford Canada's minority shareholders would seek judicial remedy, then it
seems like this might qualify as the "best method" to "provide the most
reliable measure of an arm's length result."93
There are two readily apparent pitfalls to using this approach. The
first issue is that the IRS seems to have already addressed and rejected this
approach in Chief Counsel Advisory94 200408030.9' In CCA 200408030,
"[t]axpayers claim[ed] that their compliance with state law standards of
fairness for the minority shareholders in valuing the [e]xchange is
tantamount to dealing at arm's length., 96 In a response that was short and
lacking in rationale, the IRS stated:
We have no basis, other than Taxpayers' unsupported claims, to
believe that [the terms of the transaction] satisf[y] the arm's
length standard. Moreover, we have no reason to believe that
compliance with state laws satisfies the arm's length standard.
91. The minority shareholder's remedy is, however, substantially more costly. In a
world where all transaction costs are known, the parent company might be tempted to
exploit the minority shareholder up to the point where it would be less expensive for the
minority shareholder to accept the exploitation, rather than litigate the issue. The cost of
litigation is not figured into this Comment's analysis, but would likely have to be considered
by a taxing authority when analyzing why a minority shareholder did not take action against
a transfer pricing transaction.
92. As required by 26 U.S.C. § 6662(e)(3)(B)(i)(II) (2006).
93. The "best method" language is from Treas. Reg. 1.482-1(c)(1) (as amended in
2003).
94. Chief Counsel Advisories may not be used or cited as precedent. 26 U.S.C. §
61 10(k)(3) (2006).
95. I.R.S. CCA 200408030, 2004 WL 319073, at *1 (IRS CCA 2003) [hereinafter CCA
200408030].
96. Id. at *5.
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As stated above, we do not see the relevance of state law
fiduciary duties to the application of section 482 and the
regulations thereunder, which constitute a separate and distinct
system for measuring and determining arm's length prices.97
The IRS' argument is unpersuasive. The "distinct system" 98 the IRS
has in place for "measuring and determining arm's length prices" 99 is based
on the arm's length standard, which should "be applied in every case." 100 If
minority shareholders have opposing interests to the controlling
shareholder in a transaction and have sufficient power to attack the
transaction under state law, their failure to attack is a strong indication that
they approve of the transaction. If minority and majority shareholders have
opposing interests, but both approve of the transaction, this should be
sufficient to demonstrate that the transaction meets the arm's length
standard.
The second pitfall of using failure to sue as documentation of arm's
length prices is that the IRS could simply refer to the Ford Motor case as
an example of why failure to sue does not necessarily mean that transfer
prices were fair. Even though Ford Canada's minority shareholders had
opposing interests to the majority shareholder, as well as the power to
judicially attack unfair transfer prices,0 1 they did not do so. The minority
shareholders of Ford Canada, most notably OMERS, the retirement fund,
had a substantial financial interest in monitoring Ford Canada's transfer
pricing with Ford, but, inexplicably, they did not.
Ford Canada's minority shareholders did not act to remedy the
oppressive transfer pricing policy that Ford had kept in place for thirty
years, finally taking action only when they were forced to value their
shares due to the merger. The IRS is justified in not relying on minority
shareholders to act as watchdogs of a transfer pricing policy if the
shareholders do not actually monitor it.
The final section of this Comment addresses how state fiduciary duty
law could encourage the involvement of minority shareholders in
formulating transfer prices. If minority shareholders were more involved,
this would achieve two things: it would (1) discourage derivative lawsuits,
as minority shareholders could voice their concerns early on, therefore
providing a "standard shift" that would benefit the defendants in court; (2)
allow companies to point to the active approval of minority shareholders,
rather than mere failure to object, as proof that their inter-company transfer
pricing meets the arm's length standard; and (3) allow ERISA fiduciaries to
97. Id.
98. Id
99. Id.
100. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (as amended in 2003).
101. Ford Canada's minority shareholders have this power under Canadian law.
1020 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 8:4
satisfy their legal obligation of prudence.
D. Using a "Standard Shift" as a Means Of Encouraging Minority
Shareholder Involvement
If minority shareholders were more involved in the process of
negotiating major transfer pricing policies,' °2 it would, as stated above,
discourage derivative lawsuits and possibly ease companies' transfer
pricing documentation burdens. Delaware law could encourage minority
shareholder involvement, or rather encourage majority shareholders to seek
minority shareholder input, by granting a "standard shift" to majority
shareholders who had sought and gained minority shareholder approval of
a transfer pricing policy. That is, if the majority shareholder were ever
sued for improper self-dealing as a result of a transfer pricing policy, and
the majority shareholder had previously received minority shareholder
approval, the court would judge the case under the business judgment rule,
not entire fairness.
This suggestion is not far-fetched. As previously stated, Delaware
courts grant standard shifts from entire fairness to the business judgment
rule in other situations where minority shareholder approval is obtained,
such as executive compensation cases and merger cases. Why do the
Delaware courts not currently grant the standard shift in self-dealing cases
where minority shareholder or independent director approval has been
obtained?
Delaware courts have expressly addressed this issue, stating:
[e]ntire fairness remains applicable even when an independent
committee 1°3 is utilized because the underlying factors which
raise the specter of impropriety can never be completely
eradicated and still require careful judicial scrutiny. 10 4  This
policy reflects the reality that in a transaction [involving self-
dealing and a controlling shareholder], the controlling
shareholder will continue to dominate the company regardless of
the outcome of the transaction.0 5 The risk is thus created that
those who pass upon the propriety of the transaction might
perceive that disapproval may result in retaliation by the
102. Either directly more involved, or more involved through directors specifically
informed about their interests.
103. Although not explicit in Delaware case law, approval by a disinterested committee
of Directors is generally treated as equivalent to approval by independent shareholders.
104. Kahn v. Tremont, 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997) (citing Weinberger v. UOP, 457
A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983)).
105. Id. at 428, construed in Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490,
502 (Del. Ch. 1990).
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controlling shareholder. 10 6  Consequently, even when the
transaction is negotiated by a special committee of independent
directors, 'no court could be certain whether the transaction fully
approximate[d] what truly independent parties would have
achieved in an arm's length negotiation. °"07
The court's concerns are valid. Majority shareholders do wield
power. A better solution, however, would be to make a more searching
inquiry of the procedural validity of the independent director/minority
shareholder approval process, rather than simply denying the majority
shareholder the benefit of the business judgment rule. Only when, in its
review of the independent director/minority shareholder approval process,
the court senses impropriety or influence, should the court insist on the
entire fairness standard. Otherwise, the court should allow the majority
shareholder defendant the benefit of the business judgment rule.
While the approach advocated above may seem to favor a majority
shareholder by granting deferential review, it also favors the minority
shareholder because the majority shareholder has a substantial incentive to
gain the minority shareholders' approval. Knowing that a court would
review a transaction under the business judgment rule is a large advantage
due to the difficulty a plaintiff would have in overcoming it in court.
Companies and majority shareholders realize this, and, where a
standard shift is available, they actively seek minority shareholder
participation even though it is not required.' Therefore, allowing a
majority shareholder the benefit of a standard shift when minority
shareholder approval is obtained gives the majority shareholder incentive to
actively consult the minority shareholder. This phenomenon is beneficial.
It would have prevented the thirty years of shareholder oppression in the
Ford Motor prototype, and once potential plaintiffs realize the majority
shareholder has earned the protection of the business judgment rule, they
will be discouraged from commencing lawsuits.
More relevant to this Comment, this situation will also have the effect
of giving controlled companies more ability to claim that minority
shareholder approval is evidence that the company's transfer prices are at
arm's length. Without affirmative approval of a scheme, a company can
only point to its lack of minority shareholder disapproval as evidence of the
minority shareholder's consent. As we saw in the Ford Motor prototype,
lack of disapproval does not necessarily mean consent.
With affirmative minority shareholder approval, the IRS would have a
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing Citron, 584 A.2d at 502) (emphasis added).
108. See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 330 (Del. Ch. 1997) (noting that
"shareholder approval was not required for the authorization of this transaction and was
sought only for its effect on the standard of judicial review").
1022 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 8:4
much more difficult time making the claim that they "have no reason to
believe that compliance with state laws satisfies the arm's length
standard."' 0 9 When the minority shareholder has characteristics of an arm's
length party; that is, opposing interests, and its consent to a transfer pricing
scheme is actively given, there is no reason not to believe that a transaction
does not meet the arm's length standard. Therefore, this approval by a
party with opposing interests to the majority shareholder should qualify as
the "best method" to demonstrate the arm's length nature of a transaction
under the section 482 regulations. " 0
E. Satisfying ERISA Duties by Approving Transfer Prices
If the persons in charge of a pension fund that owned a minority stake
in a controlled company were allowed to approve transfer prices, they
almost certainly could not be accused of breaching their ERISA duties with
respect to this issue. This Comment notes in Section III, supra, that
pension fund fiduciaries have a duty to inquire about issues "relevant" to
any given investment. This Comment claims that transfer prices, which
can have a huge financial impact on a company, are therefore "relevant".
By negotiating transfer prices with majority shareholders, pension
fund managers should be able to satisfy their ERISA duties with respect to
this "relevant" inquiry. Thus, the conclusion is, simply, that if Delaware
fiduciary duty laws and IRS transfer pricing rules can encourage majority
shareholders to negotiate transfer prices with minority shareholders,
fiduciaries of pension funds that hold minority interests also win, as they
are able to fulfill an ERISA-imposed duty.
V. CONCLUSION
The section 482 regulations and Delaware fiduciary duty law both
contain provisions to ensure that when a U.S. subsidiary with a foreign
majority owner engages in a transaction with its foreign parent, the prices
charged or paid by the foreign parent are fair. ERISA requires that when a
minority shareholder is a pension, the pension fiduciary must monitor the
fairness of these prices. This Comment argues that the fairness and ease of
compliance with all three bodies of law would be enhanced with two
changes.
First, in transfer pricing cases, the Delaware courts should change
their standard of review once minority shareholders' active approval is
obtained. Majority shareholders who seek out and gain minority
109. CCA 200408030 at *5.
110. The "best method" rule, described above, is set out in Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(1)
(as amended in 2003).
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shareholder approval should be afforded the protection of the business
judgment rule. This would discourage lawsuits by plaintiffs who would
realize the futility of pursuing legal action, and would also encourage
majority shareholders to mind the needs and rights of minority
shareholders. If minority shareholders were consulted, pension fund
managers should be able to satisfy their ERISA duties with respect to
transfer pricing.
As for the IRS and the section 482 regulations, the IRS should accept
that once minority shareholders approve a transfer pricing scheme, this
approval, in most cases, should be sufficient to demonstrate the arm's
length nature of the transactions. As long as minority shareholders and
majority shareholders have opposing interests with respect to the transfer
pricing scheme and there is no evidence of undue influence on the minority
shareholder, minority shareholder approval should be sufficient evidence
that parties operating at arm's length approve of the transaction.
